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INTRODUCTION

Individual suspicion is a constitutional protection of decreasing
relevance. Suspicionless civil searches occur in areas such as public health,
security, and revenue, to name but a few. 1 Case after case demonstrates
that courts can be readily persuaded that regulatory regimes must be freed
from an individualized suspicion requirement. 2 This inclination was
prevalent well before our national tragedy on September 11, 2001, and the
security concerns that have come to the fore since then only make it more
likely that the government will seek to use a suspicionless civil search
power. In the face of such pressures, the question is whether the Fourth
Amendment will remain a meaningful protection against governmental
overreaching.
The debate over this question is largely being fought in the context of the
Fourth Amendment's "special needs" principle, a controversial exception
to individualized suspicion and warrant requirements. This principle
applies where a special need "beyond the normal need for law
enforcement" exists, and allows suspicionless civil searches if a court
concludes that public interests supporting the search outweigh the
countervailing private interests against it.3 In all but one of the Supreme
Court's special needs cases, the Court has been deferential to governmental
justifications and has validated the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of
the challenged suspicionless civil search. The many commentators who
view the special needs principle as a threat to Fourth Amendment
protections commonly urge more stringent adherence to an individualized
suspicion rule.4 But they fail to address the systemic demands that have
1. "Civil searches" refers to governmental searches having civil ends, while "criminal
searches" refers to those whose primary purpose is to uncover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing.
2. See Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DuKE L.J. 787, 875-77 & nn.46680, 485-88 (1999) (surveying numerous professions in which suspicionless civil drug
searches have been upheld).
3. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
4. See infra note 90.
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made the Court more receptive to suspicionless civil searches.
This Article examines the Supreme Court's handling of these special
needs cases, with an emphasis on suspicionless searches, and argues that
both courts and commentators have insufficiently acknowledged the
tension between the modern regulatory state, which is significantly
dependent upon such searches, and adequately protecting liberty interests.
The commentators who criticize the Court's deference ignore that a
deferential approach can be justified. Suspicionless civil searches, for
example, are not necessarily incompatible with original intent.
Moreover, the many proposals for reforming suspicionless civil search
jurisprudence, such as reinvigorating the individualized suspicion
requirement, fail to acknowledge that the Court has applied deferential
review in the special needs cases because the modern regulatory state's
effectiveness is in large measure dependent upon suspicionless searches.
By the same token, the many commentators who have criticized the Court
for insufficiently guarding Fourth Amendment protections against civil
searches have had understandable reactions. These commentators are
rightly concerned about the Court's deferential review because meaningful
Fourth Amendment protections are at risk. The regulatory state has
resulted in a dramatically expanded governmental search power as
regulatory regimes extend beyond the commercial context to private homes
and the person. No longer does the federal government's regulatory arm
extend only to the railroads. Now, public health and security concerns
have resulted in regulatory regimes that include suspicionless civil searches
into the home and of the person, including coercive searches that invade the
person's very corporeal being.5 This regulatory power threatens individual
liberties, particularly since virtually all regulatory regimes can be premised
on some public health or public safety rationale.6 Such public health
invocations, at least those that are non-trivial, are paradigmatic
justifications for suspicionless civil searches. The Supreme Court
developed the special needs principle to accommodate a governmental
search power for such civil purposes, so this accommodation threatens to
undermine Fourth Amendment protections against civil searches.
To provide background knowledge for the present discussion, Part I
presents an introduction to Fourth Amendment civil searches, as well as to
special needs jurisprudence and its inadequacies. Part II suggests that
attempts to increase protections against overreaching governmental
searches must accommodate the modern regulatory state's commonplace
5. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 609 (1989)
(describing a suspicionless drug testing program that required obtaining blood, as well as
urine, samples).
6. For a case example, see infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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need to conduct suspicionless civil searches. It then reviews some
proposals others have made for improving special needs jurisprudence, and
explains that they fail to account for the need to allow suspicionless civil
searches, or the Supreme Court has rejected them because it believes they
suffer from that deficiency.
This Article then posits that, having rejected the most common proposals
for improving special needs jurisprudence, the Court may be seeking to
bring greater coherence to this area by applying a flexible deferential
standard. To explain this concept, Part III draws from administrative law
to suggest that the Supreme Court may be applying varying levels of
deference in its special needs jurisprudence, depending on the degree of
correlation between the government's asserted special need and the
predefined regulatory objective at issue. It goes on to question the wisdom
of applying varying levels of deference in special needs cases given the
degree to which agencies and legislatures can manipulate regulatory
objectives. The Article concludes by suggesting that, while a correlation
approach may have some value because it could increase the predictability
in special needs cases, it should be given a limited scope and not be
allowed to dominate other factors the courts have used to protect against
governmental overreaching.
I. BACKGROUND

A. The FourthAmendment and the Development of
the Special Needs Principle
Prior to 1967, civil searches conducted at reasonable times fell outside
the Fourth Amendment's purview. 7 In Camara v. Municipal Court,8
however, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the Fourth
Amendment's protections apply to civil searches, thus marking the
beginning of contemporary Fourth Amendment civil search jurisprudence.
Camara made a raging debate concerning the relationship between the
Fourth Amendments' two clauses, the Reasonableness Clause and the
7. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (addressing the constitutionality of

housing inspections).

Frank was consistent with the antiquated notion that the Fourth

Amendment protected only against criminal searches, and was inapplicable to civil searches.

See, e.g., Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); In re Strouse, 23
Fed. Cas. 261 (No. 13,548) (D. Nev. 1871); In re Meador, 16 Fed. Cas. 1294, 1299 (No.

9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869). In the late 1800s, the Supreme Court arguably departed from this
rule when it invoked the Fourth Amendment (in combination with the Fifth Amendment) to
invalidate the compulsory search and seizure of a party's papers for use against him in a
civil in rem forfeiture proceeding. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). But the
Court considered this to be a criminal search, see id. at 633-34, thus technically depriving
Boyd of the status of a landmark civil search case.
8. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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Warrant Clause, relevant to civil searches. 9 The subject of this debate
concerns the extent to which searches can be constitutional under the
Reasonableness Clause when governmental authorities have not obtained a
warrant or acted under probable cause (or even any suspicion whatsoever),
or conversely whether the Warrant Clause provides the measure of a
search's reasonableness and hence constitutionality.10
Initially, the
Supreme Court indicated that, as with criminal searches, it would judge the
constitutionality of civil searches of commercial and residential premises
under the Warrant Clause. 1
Soon thereafter, the Court developed the
administrative search doctrine, in which it assessed the constitutionality of
civil searches of commercial premises solely under the Reasonableness
Clause. 12 This development proved a harbinger of what was to come. The
present Supreme Court has resolved the debate concerning the relationship
between the Fourth Amendment's two clauses in favor of limiting the
Warrant Clause's application to criminal searches, while resolving the
constitutionality of all civil searches solely under the Reasonableness
Clause.13
9. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. See Ahneida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (exemplifying this
debate, as seen through a comparison of the various opinions).
11. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 523 (indicating that the home is protected under the
Warrant Clause); see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (holding that
OSHA's power to conduct searches of employee work areas is unconstitutional without a
warrant); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (indicating that a commercial
warehouse is protected under the Warrant Clause).
12. E.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (upholding the warrantless search of
a mine); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (upholding the warrantless search of
a firearm dealer); Colonnade Catering Co. v. United States, 392 U.S. 72 (1970) (upholding
the warrantless search of a liquor establishment).
13. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citations
omitted):
In most criminal cases, we strike [the Fourth Amendment] balance [between
individual and governmental interests] in favor of the procedures described by the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Except in certain well-defined
circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. We have
recognized exceptions to this rule, however, "when 'special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable."' When faced with such special needs, we have not
hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the
practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular
context.
Very persuasive scholarship supports the Court's conclusion that reasonableness is the
ultimate constitutional touchstone for governmental searches, which need not always
comply with the Warrant Clause. See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
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The Supreme Court moved away from the administrative search
doctrine, and began developing the special needs principle, as civil search
litigation less often involved commercial premises and increasingly
involved challenges to more personalized searches. Examples include
searches of homes or of an individual's personal possessions at a public
workplace.' 4 From the Court's perspective, the special needs principle has
proved wonderfully flexible. For example, the Court has applied it to civil
searches that were premised on individualized suspicion, as well as to
suspicionless civil searches.' 5
The special needs principle provides that, when a special need beyond
the normal need of law enforcement exists, courts will determine Fourth
Amendment reasonableness by balancing the competing governmental and
private interests at stake.' 6 Justice Blackmun first formulated the special
needs test in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.,17 writing that "[o]nly in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for
that of the Framers."' 8 As this formulation indicates, the special needs
principle requires consideration of three factors. Under the first factor,
special need, courts ask whether a legitimate governmental interest apart
from crime detection exists. Under the second factor, impracticability,
courts determine whether a warrant or individualized suspicion requirement
would frustrate the non-criminal governmental interest. Under the third
factor, balancing, courts inquire whether the governmental interests at stake
outweigh the private interests in order to decide the ultimate issue of
INTERPRETATION (1969); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994). But see Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197 (1993) (critiquing the limited sphere of influence

the Supreme Court has given the Warrant Clause).
14. E.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (holding that the supervision
of probationers constitutes a special need authorizing warrantless residential searches);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (assessing constitutionality of employer's search
of employee's personal possessions in the workplace). This is not to say that a strict
delineation exists between the contexts in which the Supreme Court applies the
administrative search doctrine and the special needs principle. For example, the Court has
applied the special needs principle to regulatory searches of commercial premises. See New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
15. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871, 879-80 (discussing the basis of individualized
suspicion supporting a search); see also Burger, 482 U.S. at 693-94 & n.2, 711 (involving a
suspicionless search).
16. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997); see also Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) ("[W]here a Fourth
Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.").
17. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
18. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A
negative answer to any of these three factors renders a civil search
unconstitutional under the Reasonableness Clause.
In the years since New Jersey v. T.L. 0., the Supreme Court has decided a
series of suspicionless civil search cases using the special needs principle,
the most recent of which all involved suspicionless drug testing of
individuals. In the first three of these drug testing cases, the Court
approved suspicionless drug testing of some railroad employees in Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,'9 certain customs officials in
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,20 as well as precollegiate
student athletes in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton. 2' Not until the
fourth such case, Chandlerv. Miller,22 which involved candidates for public
office in Georgia, did the Court strike down a suspicionless drug testing
regime that had come before it. Most recently, the Court expanded
Vernonia's scope through its decision in Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,2 3 in
which it held constitutional the suspicionless drug testing of all precollegiate students who participate in extracurricular activities. Apart from
border cases, 24 these drug testing cases constitute the only instances in
which the Court has held constitutional state-sponsored suspicionless civil
searches of individuals.25
The Supreme Court has made itself vulnerable to criticism by embracing
the special needs balancing test because this approach necessarily suffers
from the generalized deficits of all balancing tests. 26 Balancing raises the
19. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
20. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
21. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
22. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
23. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
24. See generally United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (holding
constitutional custom agents' random stop and boarding of a vessel for the purpose of
inspecting documentation, in the absence of any suspicion of wrongdoing); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding a fixed border patrol checkpoint located
over 60 miles from the border that allowed questioning and apprehension of illegal aliens).
25. Since New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court also has reviewed several cases involving
suspicionless searches in law enforcement contexts. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 79-80, 82-84, 85-86 (2001) (rejecting a hospital's involuntary drug testing of
pregnant women, without compliance with Warrant Clause, because the results were shared
with law enforcement); see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 45355 (1990) (validating fixed-checkpoint automobile stops used to detect intoxication). These
cases are not relevant to the present discussion because they involved criminal, rather than
civil, searches.
26. Compare T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (expressing critical views on constitutional balancing), Laurent B.
Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962), and Charles Fried,
Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76
HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963), with Frank N. Coffin, JudicialBalancing: The ProteanScales of
Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16 (1988) (approving of constitutional balancing), and Erwin N.
Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to
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risks of unbounded constitutional decisionmaking and decreases the law's
predictability. The Court, however, has sought to mitigate these
deficiencies in the special needs cases by considering factors protecting
against governmental overreaching. These factors include whether the
individual has diminished privacy interests in the context presented,27 the
search regime's invasiveness,2 8 the degree of governmental discretion it
allows, 29 the immediacy of the government interest, 30 the search regime's
efficacy,31 and its deterrence value.32 Unfortunately, the Court's efforts
ConstitutionalQuestions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167 (1963).
27. The Court has considered individuals to have diminished privacy expectations for
numerous reasons. Often, the Court analogizes to the pervasively regulated industry
rationale found in the administrative search cases, untroubled by any difference in the nature
of a search of commercial premises as opposed to of an individual. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 at 671-72 (1989) ("Customs employees who
are directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry
firearms... reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity. Much
the same is true of employees who are required to carry firearms."); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 at 627-28 (1989) ("The expectations of privacy of covered
employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated
pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness
of covered employees .... [This is particularly so because] the covered employees have
long been a principal focus of regulatory concern."); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
873-74 (1987) ("A State's operation of a probation system, like... its supervision of a
regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that
may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.").
Sometimes, the Court relies on safety rationales. See, e.g., Vemonia School Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1995) (explaining decreased privacy expectations of students
in general due to condition-specific health screenings and vaccination programs to which
they must submit, and of student-athletes in particular due to required physical
examinations); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 (noting that probationers have decreased liberty
interests in order to assure their rehabilitation and community safety). The Court also has
relied on the idiosyncratic nature of the testing subjects' environment to support a decreased
privacy expectation. See generally Pottawatomie, 536 U.S. at 822 (invoking in loco
parentis principle); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55, 657 (same and pointing to nature of
locker room life).
28. E.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658-60; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2; Skinner, 489
U.S. at 624-27 & n.7 (discussing the invasion of privacy that resulted from compelled
disclosure of prescription medications).
29. E.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 & n.6.
30. E.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-63; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673-74 (indicating that
the immediacy of the national drug problem justified a suspicionless search regime though
the Customs Service had failed to show that any actual problem existed among its
employees). The immediacy of the governmental interest also played a significant role in
Skinner. Id. In its recitation of the facts, the Supreme Court noted evidence that "on-the-job
intoxication was a significant problem in the railroad industry." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 607.
Justice Scalia, who dissented in Von Raab because he did not believe the government had
shown an immediate interest, noted that he had joined the Skinner majority in upholding the
suspicionless search regime "because the demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use
by the targeted class of employees, and the demonstrated connection between such use and
grave harm, rendered the search a reasonable means of protecting society." Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631-32.
32. E.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 n.2, 661 (discussing the value of "protecting student
athletes from injury and deterring drug use in the student population"); Von Raab, 489 U.S.
at 676; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630, 632; Griffen, 483 U.S. at 878.
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have not diminished the fear that using the Reasonableness Clause as the
controlling constitutional criterion poses an increased threat to liberty.33
For instance, because the special needs balancing test ultimately turns upon
nothing more than "reasonableness," it is a constitutional standard that is
essentially subjective, turning upon each reviewing judge's perception of
what is reasonable under the circumstances.34 This deficiency is apparent
in the special needs cases, where the Court's balancing test has been
remarkably malleable, allowing for a common factor to be treated
differently from one case to another.3 5
Prior to Chandler, the lack of constraints on the special needs analysis
was particularly troublesome. To address this deficiency, the Chandler
Court added a new requirement and emphasized that, to qualify as a special
need, the governmental justification had to be sufficiently "substantial," a
factor that encompasses the justification's importance and vitality.36 As
explained in the next section, however, this reformulation holds little hope
for improving the special needs principle.
B. The Inadequacy of ihe CurrentSpecial Needs Formulation
Though the Supreme Court has been developing its special needs
jurisprudence for over 15 years, it remains a mystery, with courts and
commentators struggling to locate the boundaries that separate
constitutional from unconstitutional suspicionless civil searches. The
Supreme Court's application of a three-step special needs analysis, which
tests whether sufficient protections against governmental overreaching

33. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REv. 349, 415 (1974); see also TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 99 ("Inspectorial searches... can
much better be dealt with by requiring that they be 'reasonable' within the first clause of the
fourth amendment. This does not, however, mean a relaxed standard .... On the contrary,
inspectorial searches can be a vehicle of abuse ranging from officious insensitivity to
corrupt or malicious oppression.").
34. See Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: ConstitutionalBalancing, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 1022, 1043, 1047-48 (1978) (stating that constitutional balancing tests allow decisions
based on judicial "intuitionism" or "essentially impressionistic reaction[s]"); see also
Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales
Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1184-85 (1988)
(balancing is not objective methodology; it leaves litigants at mercy of subjective opinions
ofjudges despite veneer of objectivity).
35. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323-27 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting);
see also Luna, supra note 2, at 875-77 & nn.466-88 (surveying conflicting lower court
results concerning the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing for attorneys,
automobile drivers, carpenters, clerks, computer specialists, custodians, federal executive
branch employees, firefighters, health and safety inspectors, high school students, law
enforcement officers, secretaries, soldiers, teachers, as well as truck drivers and commercial
vehicle operators, while pointing to "specter of whimsy" that rejects as unconstitutional the
drug testing of college athletes, meter readers, plumbers, and postal workers, but holds
constitutional similar testing of horse trainers, chemists, elevator maintainers, and cashiers).
36. Chandler,520 U.S. at 318.
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exist, 37 has proven insufficient. For example, this analysis was satisfied in
Chandler. A special need was present because (1) assuring that candidates
for public office were drug-free served a regulatory interest apart from
detecting criminal activity; 38 (2) requiring compliance with the Warrant
Clause, with the attendant probable cause requirements and delays in
enforcing a warrant, would have frustrated the goal of assuring drug free
candidacies; and (3) each individual candidate's private interests were
outweighed by the public's interest in assuring that the candidate would be
faithful to anti-drug laws. Additionally, protections against governmental
overreaching existed, as the Supreme Court acknowledged.39 Yet, the
Court held that Chandler's suspicionless drug testing program was
unconstitutional, a holding it was able to reach only after adding a new and
previously unspecified requirement of special need substantiality.40
The Court's new gloss is not helpful. Take, for instance, Michigan's
effort to impose suspicionless drug testing upon welfare applicants and
recipients.4 1 Is the state government's desire to assure a drug-free welfare
population "substantial--important enough to override the individual's
acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
37. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
38. As Georgia argued, the suspicionless drug testing regime served to "deter unlawful
drug users from becoming candidates and thus stops them from attaining high state office."
Chandler,520 U.S. at 318. Thus, the regime served non-criminal interests because "the use
of illegal drugs draws into question an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the
discharge of public functions, including anti-drug law enforcement efforts; and undermines
public confidence and trust in elected officials." Id.
39. Id. ("[W]e note.., that the testing method the Georgia statute describes is relatively
noninvasive; therefore... the State could not be faulted for excessive intrusion.").
40. See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
41. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRA) authorized states to conduct suspicionless drug testing of welfare applicants and
recipients. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the
United States Code). The PRA's title 9, § 902 provides that "[s]tates shall not be prohibited
by the Federal Government from testing welfare recipients for use of controlled substances
nor from sanctioning welfare recipients who test positive for use of controlled substances."
21 U.S.C. § 862b. After the PRA's passage, Michigan quickly moved to implement a
welfare drug testing program. See MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 400.571 (2002); see also STATE OF
MICHIGAN FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, PROGRAM ELIGIBILITY MANUAL § 280 (Program
Policy Bulletin 2000-001) [hereinafter PEM]; MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 400.57d(2),
400.57e(l)(e), 400.57g (2002). Michigan's program required the mandatory, suspicionless
drug testing, by urinalysis, of all welfare applicants, along with random testing under the
same conditions of twenty percent of benefits recipients. See MICH.COMP. LAWS § 400.571
(2002); see also PEM, supra, § 280, at 1-3 (headings "AGENCY POLICY," "WHO MUST
BE TESTED?" and "TESTING PROCEDURE").
Unless the Supreme Court intervenes, Michigan's policy is unenforceable. A
federal district court struck down Michigan's welfare drug testing program as
unconstitutional, but the decision was reversed on appeal. Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F.
Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Circuit
then vacated the initial appellate decision and granted a rehearing en banc. Marchwinski v.
Howard, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003). The en banc panel was evenly divided, which under
Sixth Circuit rules and controlling precedent resulted in an affirmance of the district court's
opinion. Marchwinski v. Howard, No. 00-2115, 2003 WL 1870916 (6th Cir. Apr. 7, 2003).
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Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion? 'A 2 One's
answer to that question is likely to closely correlate with one's view about
the ultimate reasonableness of Michigan's welfare drug testing regime.
Further, most public needs are substantial in one sense or another.
Michigan has implemented its welfare drug testing regime with the goal of
fostering self-sufficiency.43 One might argue that this is not a "substantial"
need because it does not relate to public safety considerations, which is one
way of reconciling the drug testing cases.4 4 But a state could just as easily
invoke a different need; the most obvious example is that a state could
invoke a desire to protect welfare applicants' and recipients' health. States
now have work requirements for welfare recipients, so they also could
invoke a desire to protect the well-being of a welfare recipient's coworkers. Michigan's welfare drug testing regime applies only to the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program,45 under which an
eligibility requirement is that the applicants must be raising children.
Consequently, a state such as Michigan could assert a substantial need to
protect welfare applicants' and recipients' children to show a special need
for a suspicionless drug testing regime. These possibilities provide
examples of how unlikely it is that the Court's "substantiality" factor will
prove particularly helpful in differentiating between legitimate and
illegitimate special needs that states may assert.
Michigan's welfare drug testing regime exemplifies two fundamental
problems with the Court's special needs jurisprudence. First, it lacks
predictability, especially anytime that public health conceivably could be at
issue (which is most of the time). The litigation history pertaining to the
program epitomizes this problem. The district court ruled the program
unconstitutional, the reviewing appellate panel reversed, the appellate court
vacated the reversal and granted an en banc hearing, and then the en banc
42. Chandler,320 U.S. at 318.
43. See PEM, supra note 41, § 280 (heading "AGENCY PHILOSOPHY").
44. See David A. Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing And The Privacy Rights Of
Subject Employees: Toward A General Rule Of Legality Under The Fourth Amendment, 48
U. PrrT. L. REv. 201, 217-18 (1986). This view emphasizes that suspicionless drug testing
was upheld in Von Raab and Skinner because of the damage that could be done,
respectively, by gun-toting customs officers or those with drug interdiction duties, and by
staff responsible for operating trains, while suspicionless testing was struck down in
Chandler because drug-using politicians do not present a comparable threat to public health.
Cf. Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 374-79 (6th Cir.
1998) (approving suspicionless drug testing of high school teachers because they are
responsible for students' safety). Though Vernonia and Pottawatomie emphasized harm to
self rather than others, those decisions are distinguishable because they deal with minors,
who lack complete autonomy.
45. See PEM, supra note 41, § 280, at 1-3 (headings "AGENCY POLICY," "WHO
MUST BE TESTED?" and "TESTING PROCEDURE"); see also id. § 100 at 1 (heading
"GENERAL INFORMATION").
In Michigan, the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families program is referred to as the Family Independence Program (FIP).
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court found itself evenly divided on the program's constitutionality.46 All
of this resulted in the district court being affirmed, albeit on the most
tenuous ground imaginable.47 After the parties and the judicial system had
invested a tremendous amount of resources on the issue, the public was left
with nothing more than a district court opinion on the subject, a wasteful
result attributable to the murky special needs analysis.
Second, special needs jurisprudence lacks any discernable stopping
point, a constitutional boundary beyond which suspicionless civil searches
are invalid. The limiting factors 48 that the Supreme Court has used in its
attempt to constrain the special needs reasonableness inquiry are of limited
value in establishing any such boundary, largely because of the deference
that the Court has extended in these cases. Continue to consider
Michigan's welfare drug testing regime. The Court considers welfare
recipients to have decreased privacy interests,49 which makes it easier for
the government to justify suspicionless civil searches in the welfare
context. Further, the Court approved the suspicionless drug testing regime
in Von Raab even though the Customs Service failed to establish the
existence of any actual drug problem among its employees. 50 As a result, it
is quite possible that Michigan's failure to document a similar problem
among its welfare population would not be held against it. Chandler is the
only special needs case where the Court has given the limiting factors any
bite, but the Court's deferential track record leads back to the predictability
problem and leaves one mystified as to why the limiting factors were
meaningfully applied in Chandlerbut not in other cases. 5'
These problems have led to widespread dissatisfaction with the special
needs principle. Accordingly, many commentators have offered proposals
for improving Fourth Amendment suspicionless civil search jurisprudence.
Before turning to some of those proposals, the following section will first
examine the proper historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment, and
will then turn to a crucial challenge that such proposals must confront: the
reality that the modem regulatory state is, in a very significant sense,
dependent on suspicionless civil searches.

46.

See supra note 41.

47. Id.
48. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
49.

See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-24 (1971).

50. See supra note 30.
51. Chief Justice Rehnquist thoroughly catalogued the inconsistencies between the
majority's treatment of its limiting factors in Chandler as opposed to how those same
factors had been treated in other special needs cases. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323-27
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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II. DISCUSSION

A. OriginalIntent, the Fourth Amendment, and
Suspicionless Civil Searches
Our history has been marked by an increasing concern for assuring
adequate protections from overreaching governmental searches. This
concern is likely at its zenith today after the Supreme Court's relatively
recent drug testing cases allowed suspicionless civil searches, which raise
the greatest threat of governmental overreaching,52 to extend beyond the
commercial context so that even individuals and their bodily fluids are
subject to them.53 As a result, many proposals have been made for
increasing Fourth Amendment protections against suspicionless civil
searches.
Often these proposals proceed from the premise that
suspicionless civil searches are fundamentally incompatible with the Fourth
Amendment. But history teaches that this is not so because the Fourth
Amendment, and its relationship to suspicionless civil searches, is much
more nuanced.
English history is marked by a long practice of using suspicionless
searches to further regulatory aims. 54 This practice continued in the
52. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the
arsenal of every arbitrary government [for cowing a population].").
53. The focus here on individuals might seem odd given that, traditionally, the home
has enjoyed a special status under the Fourth Amendment, perhaps even more so than
individuals. One of the most stringently guarded bright-line rules protecting against
governmental search powers applies to homes: "It is a 'basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (quoting
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971)). This heightened concern for
protecting the home goes back to ancient legal history and is consistent with the English
maxim that a man's house is his castle. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 18, 34
n.78 (Leonard W. Levy, ed., Da Capo Press Reprints in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
LEGAL HISTORY (1970)).
By contrast, the individual commonly can be subject to
governmental searches in less procedurally protective circumstances. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing warrantless stop-and-frisk search of individual upon reasonable
suspicion). Nonetheless, the focus here is on the individual rather than the home because
decades ago the Supreme Court allowed suspicionless civil searches of private homes in
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), in which the Court approved a welfare eligibility
guideline that required beneficiaries to allow investigative caseworkers to conduct home
visits. By contrast, the first non-border case in which the Court allowed a suspicionless civil
search of an individual did not occur until a decade and a half later in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
54. See LASSON, supra note 53, at 23-24 (explaining that English suspicionless searches
for regulatory purposes date back as early as the fourteenth century, such as in the monetary
and commercial contexts). In the next century, the Court of Star Chamber showed greater,
but short lived, restraint in pursuing a regulatory printing regime. Initially, the Star
Chamber enacted an ordinance that authorized searches only upon suspicion. See id. at 2425. However, a mere two years later, the Star Chamber amended this regulatory regime to
authorize unlimited search powers because the prior suspicion-based ordinance had been
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colonies, where the Crown used broad search powers for regulatory
purposes, particularly as a means of enforcing its customs laws. 5 5 Early
on, customs officials regularly conducted warrantless searches in the
56
colonies, but eventually colonists began "to resist or sue the officials,
leading to the Crown's adoption of writs of assistance as validating
mechanisms for the searches. 7 The continued, intrusive regulatory
searches, however, increasingly magnified dissatisfaction with the
monarchy, both in England and the colonies. The dissension that occurred
in England can be seen, for example, in the Crown's efforts to enforce the
1763 cider tax. 58 The resistance against intrusive regulatory searches
certainly extended
to the colonies as well, as exemplified by the 1765
59
Stamp Act Riot.
The Framers, of course, recognized the danger that a governmental
search power posed, and focused their efforts on limiting that power.
Because writs of assistance are an analog to warrants, the colonies'
experience with writs is generally discussed in terms of warrant-based
searches. But writs of assistance also are relevant to suspicionless searches
because they were so broad as to impose virtually no limits on the
searcher's discretion. As a result, though writs of assistance arguably
required suspicion to justify a search,6 ° they shared many characteristics
with suspicionless searches. 6 1 As an influential scholar has written with
regard to writs of assistance, "[t]he discretion delegated to the official
was ... practically absolute and unlimited., 62 For example, writs were of
"ineffective." See id. at 25. Later, starting in the seventeenth century, England began using
legislative statutory warrants to accomplish regulatory searches, such as in the revenue and
customs fields. See TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 26.
55. See LASSON, supra note 53, at 51-78 (describing the English use of search and
seizure laws to enforce exploitative customs and trade policies on the American colonies).
56. See id. at 55.
57. See id. at 55-56; see also Maclin, supra note 13, at 218-22. Some historical
ambiguity exists concerning the pervasiveness of the use of writs of assistance in the
colonies. Telford Taylor contends that writs were used only in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire. TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 35, 38. Taylor's view may be a bit too restrictive, as
evidence supports that writs of assistance were used at least occasionally in other colonies as
well, albeit not as commonly as in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. See LASSON, supra
note 53, at 55 & n.20, 73-75.
58. LASSON, supra note 53, at 41-42 (describing the furor aroused by the enactment of
the 1763 cider tax).
59. LASSON, supra note 53, at 68 (noting that the uproar created by the Stamp Act did
not subside once the Act had been repealed but constituted a larger feud with the Crown
over its search and seizure authority).
60. See id. at 54 ("The writ empowered the officer and his deputies and servants to
search, at their will, wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to be, and to break open
any receptacle or package falling under their suspecting eye.") (emphasis added).
61. See Gerard V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38
DEPAuL L. REV. 817, 836 (1989) (writing, with regard to writs of assistance, that
'[s]uspicion' was practically no restraint upon official discretion").
62. LASSON, supra note 53, at 54; see Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 366 ("[T]he
primary abuse thought to characterize the general warrants and the writs of assistance was
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nearly unlimited duration, remaining valid during the entire lifetime of the
sovereign under whom they had been issued and even six months after his
death.63 In addition, the writs addressed only a general subject, rather than
being specific to a particular controversy. 64 One noteworthy anecdote
concerned a judge who, with the aid of a constable, called a customs officer
to answer for the minor offense of profane swearing in "breach of Sabbathday acts., 65 After the proceeding finished, the indignant customs officer
proclaimed that he would show them a "little of [his] power," and
proceeded to thoroughly search the judge's and constable's homes--"from
the garrett to the cellar"--for uncustomed goods.66
In response to this history, the Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment
to limit the government's search power, including its power to conduct
suspicionless searches. The Warrant Clause is the most concrete example
of this effort. Through the Warrant Clause, the Framers intended to end the
use of writs by imposing more stringent requirements for obtaining
warrants, most notably the individualized suspicion requirement, as
opposed to the lesser requirements that had existed for obtaining general
warrants or writs of assistance.67
The Framers took this action because they viewed writs with hostility.68
Not only did writs essentially allow suspicionless searches because they did
little to constrain a search official's discretion, they also immunized such
an official from an aggrieved individual's suit, which otherwise could have
resulted in the official's liability for damages.69 It was for this immunizing
purpose, not to assure greater protection of the citizenry through imposition
of an individualized suspicion requirement, that British customs officers
began using writs of assistance and abandoned their practice of conducting
searches ex officio. 70 Because of the Framers' experience with regulatory
civil searches, including suspicionless ones, the Fourth Amendment

their indiscriminate quality, the license that they gave to search Everyman without
particularized cause, the fact that they were--as Wilkes proclaimed Lord Halifax's warrant
for the authors and publishers of No. 45 of the North Briton-'a ridiculous warrant against
the whole English nation."').
63. LASSON, supra note 53, at 54; TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 35; Geoffrey G. Hemphill,
The Administrative Search Doctrine: Isn't This Exactly What the Framers Were Trying to
Avoid?, 5 REGENT U.L. REV. 215, 223 (1995).
64. Id.
65. JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDICATED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 1761-1772, Appendix I at
476 n.29 (1865).
66. Id.
67. See LASSON, supra note 53, at 103; Bradley, supra note 61, at 833-38.
68. See TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 38 ("The writs of assistance were anathema in the
colonies.").
69. See Amar, supra note 13, at 771-72, 774, 779; Bradley, supra note 61, at 844.
70. See Maclin, supra note 13, at 218-22.
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represents an effort to restrain such searches out of a concern that they
could be overly intrusive.
But this does not mean that the Framers intended to impose either an
individualized suspicion or warrant requirement for all regulatory civil
searches. The Framers were not hostile to all suspicionless civil searches.
It is true that the Framers possibly displayed a preference for regulatory
search regimes based upon individualized suspicion, having promulgated
several.7 ' These search regimes required individualized suspicion and a
warrant for the most intrusive searches on land, such as searches of
commercial premises and private residences. 72 At the same time, even soon
after the nation won independence from England, the Framers supported
suspicionless civil searches of maritime vessels for regulatory purposes at
the border.7 3 But the Framers' early attempt to draw distinctions on the
basis of whether regulatory searches occurred on land or water soon proved
unsatisfactory. By 1799, the Founders chose to loosen some of the
stringent land-based regulatory search restrictions, authorizing customs
officers to open packages on suspicion of fraud without requiring them to
obtain a warrant.74 By 1815, land-based regulatory searches were further
eased when two separate Acts authorized customs officers to conduct

71. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232 (1846) (granting authority to
customs officials to stop and search for illegal goods upon suspicion); Act of Feb. 4, 1815,
ch. 31, §§ 2, 4, 3 Stat. 195, 195-96 (1846) (same); Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 67-68, 1
Stat. 627, 677-78 (1845) ("That it shall be lawful for the collector, naval officer, or other
officer of the customs, after entry made of any goods, wares or merchandise, on suspicion of
fraud, to open and examine....") (emphasis added); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1
Stat. 199, 207 (1845) (allowing search and seizure of spirits fraudulently concealed "upon
reasonable cause of suspicion"); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 46-48, 1 Stat. 145, 169-70
(1845) (providing for the search and seizure, upon suspicion, of goods subject to duty); Act
of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 22-24, 1 Stat. 29, 42-43 (1845) (giving customs officials search
and seizure powers upon suspicion of fraud in the collection of duties).
72. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232 (1846) (entitling officers to
judicially-issued warrants for the daytime search of "any particular dwelling-house, store, or
other building" if the officers suspected a concealment of undutied merchandise); Act of
Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, §§ 2, 4, 3 Stat. 195, 195-96 (1846) (same); Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22,
§ 68, 1 Stat. 627, 677-78 (1845) (same); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 Stat. 199, 207
(1845) (authorizing judges, "upon reasonable cause of suspicion," to issue warrants
allowing officers "to enter into all and every such place or places" where uncustomed spirits
might be hidden); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 48, 1 Stat. 145, 170 (1845).
73. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 1, 3 Stat. 231, 231-32 (1846); Act of Feb. 18,
1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315 (1845); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164
(1845); see United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584-85, 592 (1983)
(discussing § 31 of the Act of August 4, 1790, the Court wrote "the First Congress clearly
authorized the suspicionless boarding of vessels, reflecting its view that such boardings are
not contrary to the Fourth Amendment").
74. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 67, 1 Stat. 627, 677 (1845). Presumably, a
warrant was deemed unnecessary because protection against governmental overreaching
existed through the statute's requirement that packages could be opened only "in the
presence of two or more reputable merchants." Id.
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suspicion-based, but warrantless, searches of vehicles, beasts of burden,
and even pedestrians.75
Precisely what lesson this historical evidence holds for contemporary
Fourth Amendment interpretation can be disputed. Perhaps the Framers
merely established a narrow border-search exception to a generalized
Fourth Amendment individualized suspicion requirement, in which case the
special needs principle contravenes original intent. This view is quite
defensible. The 1799 and 1815 Acts retained suspicion requirements.
Moreover, the 1815 statutes authorizing suspicion-based but warrantless
searches on land can be seen as anomalies based on exigencies arising from
the 1812 war against Britain. Indeed, one of the 1815 Acts expressly
addresses the concern 76 of preventing the transportation of wartime
provisions to the enemy.
But a plausible argument can be made that the special needs principle is
consistent with original intent. The Framers' endorsement of suspicionless
border searches may be indicative of a general understanding that
regulatory regimes sometimes require such searches, which therefore must
be accommodated under the Fourth Amendment. This case becomes
stronger if one accepts that the Framers' departure from a warrant
requirement in the 1799 and 1815 Acts stemmed from an appreciation that
regulatory regimes require Fourth Amendment flexibility.
More importantly, it is quite likely that these Acts' individual suspicion
requirements had limited impact in constraining official discretion or
providing meaningful protection against any but the most outrageous
examples of governmental overreaching. At the time, no exclusionary rule
existed,77 and government officials who conducted searches based on

75. See Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232 (1846) (allowing customs
officers "to stop, search, and examine any carriage or vehicle, of any kind whatsoever, and
to stop any.., beast of burden, on which he shall suspect there are any goods, wares, or
merchandise, which are subject to duty, or which shall have been introduced into the United
States in any manner contrary to law" and extending search power to "any... person
travelling on foot"); see also Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 2, 3 Stat. 195, 195 (1846) (same).
76. Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 4, 3 Stat. 195, 196-97 (1846) (granting power to
search and seize, on probable cause, "all naval or military stores, arms, or the munitions of
war, cattle, live stock, articles of provisions, cotton, tobacco, goods, money, or other
supplies, transported, or attempted to be transported, ... as well as the carriage, wagon, cart,
sleigh, vessel, boat, raft, or other vehicle or vehicles, beast or beasts, used to transport the
same"). This section specifically exempts from any warrant requirement the search of "any
carriage, wagon, cart, sleigh, vessel, boat, or other vehicle, of whatever form or
construction, employed as a medium of transportation, or to packages, on any animal or
animals, or carried by man on foot." Id.
77. Under the common law, evidence was admissible regardless of how it was obtained.
See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Though the Supreme Court first excluded
evidence as a remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), the Court did not formally adopt the exclusionary rule until Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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inadequate suspicion could be held liable only for damages. 78 The need for
such damages to potentially offset the costs related to pursuing such a
remedy, discounted by the risk that no damages at all might be obtained,
most likely allowed officials to conduct suspicionless searches (or at least
limited ones) under the Acts with impunity, including suspicionless
searches of individuals traveling the new nation's byways. Thus, a
substantial argument can be made that the Framers, at a minimum,
implicitly tolerated non-border and non-maritime suspicionless searches for
regulatory purposes under the 1799 and 1815 Acts, even though those Acts
facially required suspicion as a predicate to search.
Despite the ambiguity in the historical record, commentators commonly
argue that the special needs principle is bankrupt because it departs from
the Fourth Amendment's individualized suspicion and warrant
requirements, and allows suspicionless searches based on an ad hoc
balancing test. 79 But these commentators can justify their position only in
two ways. First, they can ignore the numerous instances in which the
Framers authorized, either explicitly or implicitly, suspicionless civil
searches. Second, they can limit the implications of those instances, but
can do so only by claiming certainty where it is unobtainable. Given the
difference between the extremely limited regulatory state that existed in the
decades after the nation's founding and the expansive regulatory state that
exists today, it is not necessarily true that the boundaries of Fourth
Amendment protections should be the same today as they were for the
Framers.
B. The Difficulty in Improving SpecialNeeds Jurisprudence:Protecting
Against Governmental OverreachingWhile Accommodating the Modern
Regulatory State's Need for Suspicionless Searches
Although the extent to which the special needs principle is consistent
with original intent is debatable, it is clear that we have moved from a
limited government with a commensurately limited civil search power, to
an expansive government whose effectiveness calls for a Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that accommodates suspicionless civil searches.
In the Lochner era, the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution as
imposing extensive and substantive limits on the government's regulatory
power.80 These regulatory limits minimized suspicionless civil search
78. Amar, supra note 13, at 767 & nn.30-33 (explaining, however, that if a police
authority "merely played a hunch and proved right-if the suspect was a felon, or if the
goods were stolen or contraband-[then] ex post success apparently was a complete
defense").
79. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, On The Fourth Amendment Rights Of The Law-Abiding
Public, 1989 SuP. CT. REv. 87, 115.
80. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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regimes in two ways. First, suspicionless civil search regimes were
reduced in absolute terms because of the decreased number of regulatory
regimes in existence. Second, and perhaps less well known, is that these
substantive limits fundamentally called into question the government's
search power. Nearly twenty years before Lochner was decided, the
Court's tendency to discern substantive limits on governmental power had
already surfaced in the Fourth Amendment context in Boyd v. United
States.81 In Boyd, the Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
prohibited the government from compelling an owner of customs
documents to produce them in a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding.82 The
Boyd Court's view that the Fourth Amendment imposed substantive limits
on state-sponsored searches predictably stunted expansions in the
government's search power.
This subsequently led to a crisis in the Lochner era because the Supreme
Court's willingness to discern substantive limits on the government's
regulatory power coincided, but conflicted, with the Industrial Revolution.
Increasingly, the Industrial Revolution was viewed as causing or
contributing to important social problems in a manner that required its
management. For example, one year after Boyd, Congress passed the
Interstate Commerce Act, which ushered in the modern administrative state
by creating the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), "the first federal
regulatory agency authorized to police broadly the detailed operations of a
significant sector of the U.S. economy."8 3 Efforts to assert some regulatory
power over the Industrial Revolution continued, with Congress
subsequently passing antitrust and bankruptcy legislation. But the Supreme
Court's predisposition to find substantive constitutional limits on
governmental powers increasingly frustrated these regulatory efforts. For
instance, entities and individuals subject to the regulatory schemes resisted
them, relying on Boyd. Railroads objected to ICC investigations on
constitutional grounds, debtors sought to bar compelled production of
documents in bankruptcy, and alleged antitrust violators invoked Boyd as a
84
shield from liability.
Ultimately, the New Deal and the constitutional crisis brought about by
President Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan led the Supreme Court to reject
the Lochner era's substantive limits on government regulation. 5 This
81. 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see Amar, supra note 13, at 788 ("[Tlhe spirit inspiring Boyd
and its progeny was indeed akin to Lochner's spirit ....
82. 116 U.S. at 618-33.
83. JERRY L. MASHAW, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 4 (5th ed. 2003).
84. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure,93
MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1030-31 & nn.55-64 (1995).
85. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
10 (3d ed. 2000); Henkin, supra note 34, at 1042.
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rebuff extended
to the Fourth Amendment context through Boyd's
86
rejection.

The end of substantive Fourth Amendment limits on the government's
regulatory power helped make the modem regulatory state possible.
Though the regulatory regimes proposed during the Industrial Revolution
and as part of the New Deal focused on commercial regulation, the
regulatory state has now expanded well beyond that realm. Now, public
health and security concerns require children to submit to suspicionless
civil searches at schools where they must enroll-think mass scoliosis and
lice screenings, as well as metal detectors at schoolhouse doors--and
welfare laws require individuals to provide extensive disclosure of private
information to ascertain and maintain eligibility for benefits. In this
modem world, requiring the government to articulate a basis for suspicion
before allowing a search would cripple many of these regulatory regimes.8 7
If school officials were required to articulate a reason for believing that a
child suffered from some health-impairing condition before conducting a
search, it is quite probable that fewer children would receive proper health
care, and those that did likely would present themselves for medical
treatment in worse health. Similarly, requiring an individualized suspicion
of fraud before welfare officials could require disclosure of family finances
would fundamentally undermine welfare eligibility criteria.
Thus, we continue to be confronted with the perplexing but familiar
dilemma about how to balance legitimate governmental search needs with
adequate protections against governmental overreaching. Resolving this
dilemma in the context of suspicionless civil searches is increasingly
important now that an expansive regulatory state is entrenched, and the
implications of an erroneous choice are larger than ever.
C. Impracticableor Rejected Alternativesfor IncreasingFourth
Amendment ProtectionsAgainst Suspicionless Civil Searches
Given its analytical deficiencies, it is understandable that the Supreme
Court's special needs jurisprudence has been viewed uncharitably. Most
Fourth Amendment commentators have criticized the Supreme Court for
extending insufficient protections against suspicionless civil search
regimes, particularly prior to Chandler.88 Much of this criticism results
86. See Amar, supra note 13, at 788 n.1 19; see also Stuntz, supra note 84, at 1050 &
n.113, 1052-53, 1059; Stan Krauss, Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States
(1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, 190-211 (1977).

87. The tension between the modem regulatory state and maintaining meaningful
Fourth Amendment protections is sufficiently obvious as to have been noted before. See
Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems With Privacy's Problem, 93 MicH. L. REV. 1079,
1084, 1092-96, 1101 (1995); see also Stuntz, supra note 84, at 1048-54.
88. E.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment:
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from the special needs analysis' lack of analytic rigor, and the resulting
danger that it will fail as a bulwark against the incoming tide of the
regulatory state, with its attendant calls for ever-increasing suspicionless
searches. Due to this pervasive dissatisfaction with the special needs
principle, a great deal of Fourth Amendment literature relating to civil
searches suggests analytical devices for increasing Fourth Amendment
protections.8 9 Unfortunately, this literature does not acknowledge the
complexity of the original intent analysis regarding suspicionless civil
searches, and fails to recognize that suspicionless searches are essential to
regulatory effectiveness.
Perhaps the most common proposal for increasing Fourth Amendment
protections against suspicionless civil searches is to call for an
individualized suspicion requirement, or even application of the Warrant
Clause, before a valid governmental search should be allowed. 90 One
problem with such proposals is that they arguably are inconsistent with
history and original intent to the extent that they seek to impose a per se

Confessions of a Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553 (1996) (critiquing Vernonia on basis

that the Supreme Court erred by proceeding as if suspicionless drug testing was merely
different in degree from testing on reasonable suspicion, though actually it is different in
kind); Phoebe Weaver Williams, Governmental Drug Testing: Critique and Analysis of
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 HOFSTRA LABOR L.J. 1 (1990); The Supreme Court,
1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 269, 278 n.78 (1989); Andrea Lewis,
Comment, Drug Testing: Can Privacy Interests Be Protected Under the "Special Needs"
Doctrine?, 56 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1013 (1990); Darren K. Sharp, Note, Drug Testing and
the Fourth Amendment: What Happened to Individualized Suspicion?, 46 DRAKE L. REV.
149 (1997).
Several articles have examined legal theories that might successfully challenge
suspicionless drug testing regimes. See generally Corinne A. Carey, Comment, Crafting a
Challenge to the Practiceof Drug Testing Welfare Recipients: Federal Welfare Reform and
State Response as the Most Recent Chapter in the War on Drugs, 46 BUFFALO L. REV. 281
(1998); Philippa M. Guthrie, Note, Drug Testing and Welfare: Taking the Drug War to
UnconstitutionalLimits?, 66 IND. L.J. 579 (1991). At least one commentator welcomed
Chandleras the first case where the Supreme Court invalidated a suspicionless drug testing
regime under the special needs analysis. See Joy L. Ames, Chandler v. Miller: Redefining
"Special Needs" For Suspicionless Drug Testing Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 AKRON
L. REV. 273, 295 (1997) ("With Chandler, the Supreme Court has taken a step backward in
the right direction.").
89. E.g., Hemphill, supra note 63, at 215; Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment
Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 531 (1997) (advocating use of a strict scrutiny model in striking
the proper balance between Fourth Amendment rights and legitimate law enforcement
needs); Strossen, supra note 34; Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the
Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997); Carey, supra note 88; Sharp, supra note 88.
90. E.g., James Felman & Christopher J. Petrini, Drug Testing and Public Employment:
Toward a Rational Application of the Fourth Amendment, 51:1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
253, 280-81 (1988); Holly, supra note 89, at 562-65; James T. Ranney, The
Constitutionality of Drug Testing of College-Athletes: A Brandeis Brieffor a NarrowlyIntrusive Approach, 16 J.C. & U.L. 397, 424 (1990); Buffaloe, supra note 89, at 550, 56162; Sharp, supra note 88, at 171-72.
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rule of unconstitutionality any time individualized suspicion does not
support a civil search. 9
Moreover, though an individualized suspicion requirement appears
superficially attractive to the extent that, unquestionably, it would increase
the scope of constitutional protections against governmental searches,
applying such a requirement conflicts with the government's need under
the modern regulatory state to conduct some amount of suspicionless civil
searches. Consider, for example, the restaurant health inspections that
municipalities conduct.
These regulatory schemes would lose their
efficacy if some form of individualized suspicion were necessary for the
governmental search to occur. Yet, it is unlikely that the citizenry would
find acceptable a constitutional regime that imposed a buyer-beware
restaurant industry upon them, with its corresponding public health
implications.
This leads to another problem with imposing an individualized suspicion
requirement, namely that it will create problems with identifying proper
exceptions to the rule. For example, a proponent of an individualized
suspicion requirement might address the restaurant health inspection issue
by suggesting an exemption only for commercial civil searches, while
preserving a suspicion requirement in other contexts, especially for
searches of individuals. Unfortunately, that approach is unfeasible, as the
suspicionless security searches conducted of all airport passengers
demonstrates. Particularly after recent tragic events, it is difficult to
imagine anyone who would be satisfied with a constitutional regime that
precluded the government from conducting security searches at airports
unless a basis for individualized suspicion could be articulated. Further,
adding a criminal/civil distinction does not alter the debate.
If, for
example, attempting to board a plane with a utility knife were merely a
civil offense punishable by a monetary fine, rather than a criminal offense,
surely an individualized suspicion requirement still would be universally
condemned.
Not only would imposing an individualized suspicion requirement create
problems with identifying proper exceptions to the rule, but such a
requirement would be viable only with exceptions that swallow the rule, or
an unnatural definition of what constitutes a "search. 92 Consider the issue
of creating what are supposed to be "narrowly-tailored" exceptions. Since
many regulatory schemes would be hobbled under a suspicion-based
Fourth Amendment regime, this option is unwieldy because exceptions

91. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
92. See Amar, supra note 13, at 783-84 (drawing similar conclusions for probable cause
requirement in criminal context).
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necessarily would proliferate.9 3 As a result, the pervasiveness of the
regulatory state surely would cause the individualized suspicion rule to be
honored often, if not mainly, in the breach. Due to the modem regulatory
state's rise, these exceptions would span the gamut of search targets.
Certainly, exceptions would apply to many regulatory searches in the
commercial context, such as workplace safety inspections or the corporate
disclosures that are mandated under securities laws. But exceptions to an
individualized suspicion requirement also likely would extend to more
personalized regulatory search regimes. For example, residences are
subject to municipal housing inspections.94 Even individuals often must
subject themselves to regulatory regimes whose effectiveness is dependent
on suspicionless searches, such as when individuals are forced to disclose
private information to satisfy tax-reporting requirements or to obtain
eligibility for welfare benefits.
Another option would be to manipulate the meaning of what constitutes
a "search."
Such reasoning is utterly unsatisfying and unacceptably
contorts the Fourth Amendment. A regulatory security search at an airport
does not pass constitutional muster because it falls outside some distorted
definition of what constitutes a "search," but because it is a search that is
reasonable.95
Adopting a least intrusive means analysis for suspicionless civil searches
is another option for increasing Fourth Amendment protections. Indeed,
this is a promising alternative, and commentators have made a very strong
case for it. 96 Further, it is certainly plausible that a least intrusive means
93. Compare, for example, the rampant exceptions to the general criminal rule that
searches are unconstitutional absent a warrant. At least when taken together, those
exceptions can hardly be deemed "narrow" now that the warrant requirement does not apply
to: searches incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); searches
performed under exigent circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967);
consent searches, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-86 (1990), United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-71 (1974); plain view searches, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
328 (1987); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 297-98, 300-01 (1987); California v.
Ciraolo,476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); stop and frisk searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31
(1968); or automobile searches, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). And this is not
even an exhaustive list of the warrant requirement exceptions in Fourth Amendment
criminal jurisprudence. For an excellent review of the warrant requirement and its
exceptions, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (3d ed. 1996).
94. These searches ostensibly are subject to the Warrant Clause. See Camara v. Mun.
Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967). However, the "regulatory warrants" that justify these searches
essentially allow suspicionless searches. The value of these regulatory warrants is not to
assure the satisfaction of some threshold level of individualized suspicion, but to limit the
government's discretion in executing the search. See Schulhofer, supra note 79, at 91-93 &
n.17.
95. Cf Amar, supra note 13, at 768-70.
96. For the best of these proposals, see Strossen, supra note 34, at 1208-66. For other
supporters of this approach, see Holly, supra note 89, at 578-86, and Kevin C. Newsom,
Recent Development, Suspicionless Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment: Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), 19 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 209, 213 &
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analysis could accommodate the modem regulatory state's need to engage
in suspicionless civil searches. In spite of all this, the case against a least
intrusive means requirement is quite straightforward: the Supreme Court
has, when deciding the constitutionality of suspicionless civil searches,
repeatedly (and perhaps even vociferously) rejected this option. 97 Thus,
absent a significant and quite unexpected change in the Supreme Court's
position, this alternative simply is not available.
As explained in the preceding section, efforts to increase Fourth
Amendment protections against suspicionless civil searches must confront
that, in a very real sense, the modem regulatory state's efficacy is
dependent upon such searches. Though an individualized suspicion
requirement is a popular proposal for amending special needs
jurisprudence, ultimately such proposals are misguided because they fail to
account for the post-Lochner advent of the modem regulatory state, which
cannot effectively operate under an individualized suspicion requirement,
much less the Warrant Clause's strictures. 98 Similarly, the Supreme Court
clearly has rejected a least intrusive means analysis out of a fear that such a
standard also would prove too restrictive of the government's regulatory
power. This was particularly clear in Skinner, where the Court explicitly
invoked the time and effort invested in fashioning a new regulatory regime
as a justification for its refusal to second guess the government's regulatory
judgment. 99

n.35 (1995).
97. E.g., Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) ("We have
repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 n.12 (1976).
98. E.g., Hemphill, supra note 63, at 246, 256 (arguing for return to original conception
of Fourth Amendment protections, namely "protect[ing] individuals from government
intrusion without suspicion and.., proper procedural safeguards," without addressing the
feasibility of that change in light of the modern regulatory state).
99. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9 (citations omitted and emphasis added):
Respondents offer a list of "less drastic and equally effective means" of addressing
the Government's concerns, including reliance on the private proscriptions already
in force, and training supervisory personnel "to effectively detect employees who
are impaired by drug or alcohol use without resort to such intrusive procedures as
blood and urine tests." We have repeatedly stated, however, that "[t]he
reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily or
invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means." It is obvious
that "[t]he logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise
insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers,"
because judges engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct "'can
almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the
[government] might have been accomplished."' Here, the [government] expressly
considered various alternatives to its drug-screening program and reasonably found
them wanting. At bottom, respondents' insistence on less drastic alternatives
would require us to second-guess the reasonable conclusions drawn by the
[government] after years of investigation andstudy. This we decline to do.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. A New Model: Merging Deference to the Regulatory State with Fourth
Amendment Constitutionality
Understandably, critics of special needs jurisprudence are frustrated with
the Supreme Court. While the Court has rejected the most common
proposals for increasing Fourth Amendment protections against
suspicionless civil searches, it has voiced very little useful guidance as to
the constitutional bounds of such searches. But maybe the Court is
developing its special needs jurisprudence in a subtle, perhaps even
unconscious, manner. This possibility is evident if one views the special
needs cases through an administrative law lens. Over the last few decades,
as judicial review in administrative law has become more deferential
towards government agencies, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also has
become more accepting of governmental justifications for suspicionless
civil searches. The similar tracks that administrative law and Fourth
Amendment civil search cases have followed may be more than
coincidental. Many of the suspicionless civil search cases have involved an
overlap between administrative law and the Fourth Amendment because
the defending party was a governmental agency. Even the more recent
special needs cases can be viewed from an administrative law perspective
because they all involve a governmental defendant that, while perhaps not a
public agency in the traditional sense, can be defined in terms of an
administrative mission. For example, though public schools do not fall
within the classic notion of governmental agencies, public administrative
missions such as educating minors or maintaining their safety easily can be
attributed to them.
Viewed from this perspective, a greater degree of predictability may be
available in the suspicionless civil search cases if one focuses upon the
degree of correlation between the asserted special need and the predefined
regulatory end. The cases seem to support more deferential judicial review
when the Supreme Court believes that a strong correlation exists, and less
deferential review as the gap widens between the special need and the
regulatory objective. However, as explained below, the usefulness of this
approach is questionable.
1. High Degree ofDeference in Administrative Law and Special Needs
Cases
1°°
agency decisions are presumptively subject to review.
Administrative
The Supreme Court embarked on an effort to limit the scope of that review,

100. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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however, in response to a perception that a quagmire of litigation had been
thwarting progress on administrative agendas. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court expanded the
scope of discretionary agency decisionmaking, holding that when a dispute
involves statutory uncertainty, courts may not substitute their 1preferred
0
construction of a statute for an agency's reasonable interpretation. '
An interesting parallel exists between this administrative law deference
and the Fourth Amendment special needs doctrine. The special needs cases
echo the high degree of deference in administrative law cases because, 1in
02
the former, the Supreme Court is essentially applying rationality review.
With the exception of Chandler, absent from the special needs cases is any
searching inquiry into governmental justifications or motives behind
implementing a suspicionless civil search regime.
One of the best examples of the Supreme Court's deferential approach in
special needs cases is its repeated lack of concern, especially since the
Chevron era's advent, about the possible criminal ramifications of a
suspicionless civil search. The Court's indifference to this risk is manifest
in various suspicionless civil search cases involving drug testing,
junkyards, and welfare home visits. 10 3 The Court's lax attitude is dangerous
because the permissive civil search doctrines easily could be used to evade
the more demanding Fourth Amendment protections applicable to criminal
searches.
The junkyard case is particularly disquieting because, in
accordance with the enabling statute, police, rather than administrative
agents, carried out the civil search. 104 Further, the civil search very quickly
became a criminal search after the junkyard owner admitted to having
violated the administrative record-keeping requirements because the
police's subsequent search of the premises05 had no purpose other than to
uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing. 1
101. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Hon. Patricia M. Wald, JudicialReview in Midpassage:
The Uneasy PartnershipBetween Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 244

(1996) ("Chevron was basically meant as a device to enhance the power of agencies vis-avis the courts and Congress."); see also id. at 247 ("Chevron was a preemptive strike to
force the courts out of the business of telling the agencies what they could do, or could not
do, when the law itself was not clear.").
102. See Maclin, supra note 13, at 236-39 (positing that "minimum judicial review is
condoned in search and seizure cases because the Court has 'relegated [the Fourth
Amendment] to a deferred position') (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)); see also William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government
Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 554 (1992) (explaining that the

concept of special needs is ill-defined).
103.

See Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (drug testing); see also

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 & n.5 (1989) (drug testing);
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 (1987) (junk yards).

The Supreme Court's

indifference also extended to one pre-Chevron case. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,
323 (1971) (welfare home visits).
104. Burger,482 U.S. at 693-94 & n.1.
105.

See Schulhofer, supra note 79, at 103.
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Though the Supreme Court's deferential review has alarmed Fourth
Amendment proponents, it is not necessarily wrong. Clearly, rationality
review applies to certain areas of constitutional jurisprudence, such as the
equal protection doctrine when no classification receiving special
protection is at issue. By the same token, the deferential review that the
Supreme Court has applied in special needs cases contrasts quite sharply
with the skepticism the Supreme Court has evinced towards governmental
justifications in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence. One example is
the equal protection doctrine when a suspect classification is at issue. For
example, in cases alleging race discrimination the Court applies strict
scrutiny. 10 6 Another example is first Amendment free speech doctrine
involving prior 07restraints because there the Court presumes
unconstitutionality. 1
Approached on these terms, the special needs cases might represent a
Supreme Court struggle to determine the proper scope of constitutional
review applicable in all Fourth Amendment cases. If this is so, it certainly
appears that those preferring deferential review are prevailing, not only
when civil searches are at issue, as demonstrated by the special needs
cases, but also in criminal search cases, as exemplified by the "good faith"
exception that applies to searches conducted under invalid warrants. 08
2. Determiningthe Level of Deference Based on the CorrelationBetween
the Special Need and the UltimateRegulatory Objective
Regardless of one's opinion of the Supreme Court's special needs
jurisprudence, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Chandler is an
especially instructive decision because it is the only special needs case
where the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a suspicionless drug
testing regime. So what should we learn from Chandler? Perhaps that the
regulatory end to be achieved is of central importance in determining
Fourth Amendment constitutionality in special needs cases. Under this
106. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
107. Free speech rights are considered so important that the Supreme Court has
consistently iterated a long-standing rule that courts presume the unconstitutionality of
content-based prior restraints. E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S.
803, 817 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 82930 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994); Lovell v. City of Griffen, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 450-52
(1938); Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, Co., 283 U.S. 697, 713-18 (1931). For
thoughtful discussions of the prior restraint doctrine, see Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955), John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,
Rethinking PriorRestraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983), and Martin H. Redish, The Proper
Role of the PriorRestraintDoctrine in FirstAmendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53 (1984).
108. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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approach, the dispositive issue is not whether the special need is
substantial, as the Supreme Court stated in Chandler.0 9 Rather, the central
issue in the special needs cases might be the degree to which the
government's asserted special need facilitates a predefined regulatory end.
This appears to be a flexible, sliding-scale inquiry. The closer the special
need correlates to the ultimate regulatory objective, the more deference is
extended to the suspicionless civil search regime. Correspondingly,
judicial review of the justification proffered in favor of the regime is less
demanding.
The proposed approach explains the outcomes in Skinner, Von Raab, and
Chandler. In Skinner and Von Raab, the suspicionless civil search regime
bore a close correlation with the predefined regulatory objectives. The
regulatory objective in Skinner was to assure the operation of the nation's
railways, while in Von Raab it was to enforce the nation's drug laws.
These regulatory objectives cannot reasonably be separated from safety
concerns. Safety is more than merely an indirect, implicit objective of
these regulatory regimes because each would be considered an abject
failure if public safety was not assured. A close correlation existed in
Skinner because it is difficult to contest that drug-using railway workers
would jeopardize safety. A similar situation applied to the customs officers
in Von Raab, at least those that sought to attain positions directly involving
the interdiction of illegal drugs or that required carrying firearms. Thus,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Customs Service's suspicionless drug
testing of these employees."
Notably, the special need/regulatory end
correlation is weaker with regard to customs employees applying for
positions where they would handle classified information. Though public
safety issues might be implicated in that situation, the correlation is less
direct than compared to a front-line interdiction officer or one who carries a
firearm. Therefore, consistent with the correlation hypothesis, the Supreme
Court applied less deference when reviewing that issue and remanded for
further consideration as to employees who would have access to classified
material.' 1 1
In contrast to Skinner and Von Raab, a significant disjunction existed in
Chandler between the government's asserted special need and the
predefined regulatory end. Chandler involved the suspicionless drug
testing of candidates for certain public offices in Georgia. Undoubtedly,
the candidates were subject to regulation, such as financial disclosure
requirements and campaign contribution restrictions and reporting

109. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
110. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
111. Id.at 677-78.
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standards.' 12 But little, if any, correlation existed between those regulatory
ends and Georgia's asserted special need to drug test the candidates absent
any suspicion. While an argument can be made that having a drug-free
candidate would foster compliance with campaign regulations, the
correlation is tenuous, and certainly much weaker than the correlation that
existed in Skinner and Von Raab. Thus, from an administrative law point
of view, one can understand why the Supreme Court applied less
deferential review in Chandler, leading it to strike down the suspicionless
drug testing program.
Though the degree of deference extended often may be predictive of
outcomes, it should not be dispositive. One could imagine cases presenting
shockingly intrusive special needs searches that likely would be ruled
unconstitutional though a close correlation existed between the special need
and the regulatory end. For example, there is no doubt that the
suspicionless civil searches that take place at airports prior to boarding
improve public safety, which is a central objective of airline regulations.
Thus, one would expect that judicial review of constitutional challenges to
such searches would be quite deferential. But that is not to say that the
outcome of such challenges would be preordained. If the regulatory regime
involved universal strip searches of all passengers to preclude the
smuggling of deadly explosives in body cavities, one would expect the
suspicionless civil search regime to be held unconstitutional.
Thus, though the correlation hypothesis may help determine the level of
deference that will be extended in a given special needs case, courts should
continue to consider other factors that protect against governmental
overreaching, 1 3 which in some cases may be dispositive regardless of the
level of deference that applies. The converse also should be true, namely
that a suspicionless civil search could be constitutional despite rigorous
judicial review resulting from a lack of correlation between the asserted
special need and the predefined regulatory end because, for example, the
search was negligibly intrusive.
One would expect that the hypothesis proposed here would not
necessarily apply to the pre-Chevron era. That is indeed the case. For
example, in Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States, 1 4 the
Supreme Court invalidated a forcible warrantless search of a liquor
licensee's premises, limiting the available administrative remedies for the
licensee's failure to allow the search to a fine because it was the only
112.

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5-30 (regulating campaign contributions), 21-5-32

(outlining campaign contribution accounting requirements), 21-5-34 (specifying
requirements for disclosure reports), 21-5-50 (financial disclosure requirements).
113. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
114. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
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expressly allowed penalty in the administrative regime. Instead of
following a deferential administrative law model, which had not yet come
into being, the Colonnade Court demonstrated a willingness to actively
intervene into administrative proceedings and take a narrow view of the
agency's delegated power.
In contrast to Colonnade, some decisions from the same period are
consistent with the theory that the Supreme Court's deference in reviewing
the constitutionality of suspicionless civil searches depends on the
correlation between the asserted special need and the predefined regulatory
end. For example, Wyman v. James1 15 approved of suspicionless home
searches of welfare recipients, and United States v. Biswell 11 6 permitted the
suspicionless search of a federally licensed firearm dealer's locked
storeroom. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court held that a close
correlation existed between the special need to conduct suspicionless
searches and the predefined regulatory end. In Wyman, the regulatory end
was the need to determine welfare eligibility through a non-adversarial
relationship between welfare recipient and caseworker. In Biswell, because
of the federal government's interest in regulating interstate firearm traffic,
the Court termed suspicionless inspections "a crucial part of the regulatory
1 17
scheme."
These cases show an evolution in the Supreme Court's civil search
jurisprudence. Pre-Chevron, the Court sometimes actively questioned
administrative power related to civil searches. In the days since deference
to the administrative state firmly took hold, however, the Supreme Court
hardly has vacillated in the high level of deference that it applies to civil
search cases. One of the best examples of the Court's contrasting levels of
deference over time in suspicionless civil search cases is its treatment of
the possible criminal implications of such searches. In earlier cases, before
the age of deference, the Court at least professed concern about such
implications." 8 But now, as discussed above, unless the challenger is able
to make an affirmative pretextual showing, the Court is quite content to
plainly ignore the criminal implications of suspicionless civil searches.1 19

115.

400 U.S. 309 (1971).

116. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
117. Id.at 315-16.
118. See Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
119. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. Recently, in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), the Supreme Court appears to have provided some
guidance as to how such a pretextual showing can be made. Though it did not expressly
address the pretext issue, the majority was unwilling to proceed as if only a civil search was
at issue because, from its inception, the search program had sought to advance criminal law
objectives. See id. at 82-83 & n.20.
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B. The Limits of FourthAmendment Deference
Profound separation of powers concerns arise if the Supreme Court is
merging the deferential model from administrative law with Fourth
Amendment constitutionality. Chevron deference in administrative law is
posited upon majoritarianism. Therefore, the proper relationship between
majoritarianism and Fourth Amendment constitutionality is central to
whether a merger between administrative law and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is advisable. Arguments in favor of Fourth Amendment
majoritarianism have been made. These arguments have a certain appeal,
particularly given the persistent criticisms that have been made of Fourth
Amendment civil search jurisprudence. Where the constitutional
touchstone is reasonableness, why not entrust decisions as to whether
particular searches are reasonable to the majority? By passing search laws,
legislatures would express their views on the constitutionality of the search
regime. Specific searches could be judged through other majoritarianist
methods, such as jury trial. Undeniably, majoritarianism could be used to
construct a coherent Fourth Amendment civil search jurisprudence. The
problem with a majoritarian view of the Fourth Amendment, however, is
that it requires a fundamental change in how we conceive of the Bill of
Rights and of the judiciary's role under the separation of powers.
Chevron is based upon a profoundly majoritarian separation of powers
concern. The Chevron Court made this clear when it wrote:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision...
really centers on the wisdom of an agency's policy, rather than whether
it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the
challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who have no
constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by

those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such
policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of
the public interest are not judicial ones:120"Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches."
Chevron deference therefore "assuage[s] another of the prime
constitutional anxieties bred by broadly delegative statutes: the fear that
the power to define public
policy is passing out of the hands of the people's
' 21
representatives."'
elected
Chevron formulated a test to determine when, under the separation of
powers, the majority or the judiciary should decide the legality of
governmental action. Underlying the test is the Chevron Court's
presumption that Congress means to confer discretion upon executive
120. 467 U.S. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)) (emphasis added).
121. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation And The Balance Of Power In The
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452,499 (1989).
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agencies while they accomplish their legislatively mandated missions.122
As a result of this presumption, Chevron extended deference to agencies
charged with construing ambiguous statutes.1 23 Only if the statute is
unambiguous is the judiciary charged with ruling on whether the executive
action is consistent with legislative authorization. 24 The separation of
powers doctrine demands this result because the "judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent."' 25 Through
this division, the Chevron Court delineated the majoritarianist and
adjudicative zones of responsibility in administrative law under the
separation of powers, and intended to promote majoritarianism by limiting
judicial involvement in administrative disputes. One of the Court's
justifications for this approach was that the legislature might properly
delegate to the executive branch the power to make statutory policy
decisions, which the judiciary should avoid because such choices are
viewed as being properly committed to the executive branch. 126 This
justification was at the heart of Chevron's majoritarian concern.
A case can be made for extending similar deference in the suspicionless
civil search cases, many of which fit neatly into the Chevron paradigm of
delegated statutory authority. In Skinner, as well as in the case of
Michigan's suspicionless welfare drug testing program, the challenged
suspicionless drug testing regimes were imposed through regulatory power
premised on a statutory authorization. In Skinner, the Federal Railroad
Administration based its regulatory authority to impose a suspicionless
122. See Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More Unto The Breach: Reconciling
Chevron Analysis And De Novo Judicial Review After United States v. Haggar Apparel
Company, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1167, 1189 (2000); see also Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory
InterpretationTo Improve The Legislative Process: Can It Be Done In The Post-Chevron
Era?, 13 J.L. & POLITICS 105, 118 (1997); Karin P. Sheldon, "It's Not My Job To Care":
UnderstandingJustice Scalia's Method Of Statutory Interpretation Through Sweet Home
And Chevron, 24 B.C. ENVTL.AFF. L. REV. 487, 497 (1997).
123. See 467 U.S. at 843-45.
124. See id. at 843-44.
125. See id. at 843 n.9.
126. Kelly & Reed, supra note 122, at 1192; Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism
And The Chevron Doctrine: In Defense Of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 401
(1996). The Court's other two justifications were that (1)judicial deference to the executive
branch was warranted because statutory ambiguity was presumed to equate with either an
explicit or implicit legislative delegation of authority to the executive branch, and
(2) agencies, as compared to the courts, have a greater expertise and ability to carry out
regulatory missions. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. As Professor Farina has pointed out,
the first of these justifications is debatable. Farina, supra note 121, at 467-69. As for the
second justification, the Chevron view is that agencies can be trusted to select acceptable
interpretations of ambiguous statutes because of their expertise in their regulatory area,
which results from their (1)greater resources in comparison to judges, (2) interest in hiring
specialists, (3) ability to obtain information without relying upon litigants, (4) familiarity
with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue, and (5) practical knowledge of what
will best effectuate those purposes, See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45; see also Kelly &
Reed, supra note 122, at 1189; Bell, supra note 122, at 145; Maggs, supra, at 401.
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drug testing regime on railroad workers upon its statutory authority to
"'prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and
standards for all areas of railroad safety.', 127 Similarly, in the welfare drug
testing example, the federal statute that authorized states to impose such
testing clearly represented a congressional intent to delegate power to the
states.128 The Michigan legislative scheme that required the testing in turn
delegated to the Michigan welfare department a substantial amount of
power to design the program. Except for imposing reporting requirements
upon the welfare agency and requiring retesting to avoid false positives, the
Michigan legislature provided few details concerning the drug testing
program that it wanted implemented. 29 Based on little guidance from
either the federal or state legislatures, the Michigan welfare department
30
created detailed rules for a comprehensive drug testing program.1
The primacy that Chevron gives to majoritarianism is not necessarily
incompatible with the Fourth Amendment. Professor Bradley, for instance,
has argued that modern conceptions of the Fourth Amendment are
inadequate, and that in their stead we should adopt a model in which
Congress has at least primary, if not exclusive, authority to define the scope
of lawful searches. 13 1 He contends that the Fourth Amendment's
Reasonableness Clause is only "a positive theoretical statement of the
nature of 'liberty' and 'rights' in the Constitution," and that a proper
understanding of the Bill of Rights, derived from its structure, reveals that
the majority's right to make laws overrides any individual's right to be
governed according to any norms. 132 In his view:
[T]he people are affirmed in their right to govern the search and seizure
activity of its [sic] government through laws of their choosing. The
reasonableness clause ...

places the government on notice that the

measure of appropriate search and seizure is that with which the people
would burden themselves if delegation of lawmaking authority to
Congress was not obliged by the extended sphere of the republic....
Individuals have no claim to be governed by particular
search and
133
seizure laws other than the ban on general warrants.
Professor Bradley is not alone in arguing for a 34significant role for
majoritarianism in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'
127. See 489 U.S. at 606 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 431(a)).
128. Congress provided no guidance concerning the details of any welfare drug testing
program. It merely authorized states, through a negative declaration, to impose drug testing
upon their welfare populations. See supra note 41 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 862b).
129. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.571 (2002) (enabling the "family independence
agency [to] require substance abuse testing as a condition for [assistance eligibility]").
130. See PEM, supra note 41, § 280.
131. Bradley, supra note 61, at 855-58.
132. Id. at 860-61.
133. Id. at 862.
134. See Lundy Langston, Sweep Searches-The Rights of the Community, and the
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Accepting a majoritarian view of the Fourth Amendment could justify a
deferential suspicionless civil search jurisprudence. Chevron deference is
premised on the legislature delegating lawmaking authority to the
executive. Similar judicial deference could result from the majority
delegating to the legislature the power to define the proper scope of Fourth
Amendment protections against suspicionless civil searches. Once the
majority has legitimately transferred the power to the legislature, the
legislature may delegate it once again to the executive branch so long as it
does so through a legislative act announcing an "intelligible principle" that
courts can use to evaluate whether the executive branch is properly
35
applying its power.1
The difficulty in extending Chevron's deferential model to suspicionless
civil searches is, of course, that the executive action in the search cases has
a constitutional dimension because it must conform to the Fourth
Amendment's strictures. By contrast, the Chevron model is restricted to
statutory law. This constitutional/statutory distinction must be fully
examined because of its separation of powers implications.
The correlation hypothesis proposed here could be used to account for
the constitutional dimension in the suspicionless civil search cases.
Chevron used statutory ambiguity to properly delineate the judicial role
under the separation of powers doctrine when entertaining challenges to
administrative actions.
Similarly, the correlation between the
government's asserted special need and the predefined regulatory end could
be used to delineate the judiciary's role in resolving challenges to the
constitutionality of suspicionless civil searches. A strong correlation would
result in strong deference to the executive branch's search. An absence of
a correlation would result in the judiciary extending no deference to the
executive branch's claim that it was empowered to conduct the search. In
between would be a sliding scale of deference, in which the degree of
deference the judiciary extends would depend upon the degree of
correlation that exists.
This approach, however, raises fundamental separation of powers
concerns because a Fourth Amendment deferential regime has much graver
separation of powers implications than does Chevron's statutory deference.
Guarantees of the Fourth and First Amendments: Moms of the Chicago Public Housing
Complex, Revisit Your Civil and Constitutional Rights and Save Your Babies, 11 Wisc.
WOMEN's L.J. 259 (1996) (arguing that a super-majority of public housing tenants should be
allowed to democratically waive their Fourth Amendment right against sweep searches). In
proposing that Fourth Amendment reasonableness might be subjected to civil jury decisions,
Professor Amar has proposed a Fourth Amendment reasonableness regime with majoritarian
undertones. See Amar, supra note 13, at 818 ("'Reasonableness' is largely a matter of
common sense, and the jury represents the common sense of common people.").
135. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Farina, supra note 121, at 483-87.
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Using the correlation hypothesis to apportion power to decide Fourth
Amendment constitutionality threatens to destabilize the separation of
powers in a manner that delegating statutory policy-making does not.
Since Marbury v. Madison, the judiciary has declared that interpreting the
Constitution is its quintessential responsibility.' 3 6 The separation of powers
concerns that animate Chevron and are ubiquitous in administrative law
have not weakened the judiciary's primacy in constitutional matters. For
example, administrative expertise-a crucial justification for Chevron
deference-does not extend to defining the scope of constitutional
protections.
Nothing in Chevron justifies a full-scale retreat from the judiciary's
adjudicative role in our constitutional scheme, particularly because
Chevron's notion of delegable power is largely inapplicable to
constitutional litigation. Chevron's premise is that the legislature has
delegated power (in the form of a policy choice) to the executive branch.
In this respect, Chevron is faithful to the regulatory state, which exists only
because our jurisprudence has accepted the view that the legislature may
delegate a portion of its lawmaking power to the executive.' 37 But neither
the legislature nor the executive branch has the power to delegate any
portion of the judiciary's constitutional adjudicatory power. To the
contrary, the Court has carefully guarded its adjudicatory power and
rejected the possibility
that any portion of it might be transferred to the
38
executive branch.1
Another justification for extending Chevron-style "strong" deference
into special needs jurisprudence also comes up short. The case for
adopting a deferential Fourth Amendment model is helped by the
legislature's and the executive's responsibility for considering the
constitutionality of laws. Arguably, using the correlation hypothesis to
allocate each branch's scope of power to determine Fourth Amendment
constitutionality is proper because it does nothing more than recognize that
the judiciary is not the only branch charged with determining
constitutionality. The legislative and executive branches work together to
make, enforce, and modify laws. While carrying out these responsibilities,
these branches are charged with making their own constitutional
determinations and to avoid implementing laws that they believe are
136. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and
the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7-12 (1983).
137. Farina, supra note 121, at 478-87; Monaghan, supra note 136, at 25 & n.143.
138. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) ("[T]he 'judicial power of the
United States' vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more
be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with
the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override
a Presidential veto.").
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unconstitutional. The correlation hypothesis, the argument goes, could be
used simply to help allocate this division of responsibility.
The
shortcoming of this argument, however, is that the perspectives of the
legislative and executive branches on constitutionality have always been
merely persuasive authority to which the judiciary may turn.
Drawing the line beyond which courts would not meekly defer to the
constitutional determinations of the other branches in suspicionless civil
search cases would be crucial to the legitimacy of any deferential Fourth
Amendment approach, due to the different separation of powers concerns
that exist in constitutional, as opposed to statutory, adjudication. These
separation of powers concerns mandate that any adopted deferential Fourth
Amendment regime could not be allowed to empower the executive and the
legislature to effectively exclude the judiciary from constitutional
determinations.
The threat of a deferential regime being used to exclude the judiciary is
real. Focusing upon the degree of correlation between the asserted special
need and the predefined regulatory end threatens to emasculate Fourth
Amendment protections because regulatory ends are sufficiently
amorphous to be subject to both executive and legislative manipulation.
For instance, suspicionless welfare drug testing fails a correlation test if the
regulatory purpose is to meet the client populations' minimal financial
needs. But the executive, through the relevant governmental agency, could
add a drug-free requirement to the eligibility criteria. If necessary, the
legislature could ratify the agency's action.
Moreover, even if a successful challenge could be lodged against the
rationality of the new eligibility criteria based on its lack of foundation
with the predefined regulatory end, the legislature is empowered to change
that regulatory end to one that meets the correlation test. The welfare drug
testing cases become much harder to attack under a correlation theory if,
for example, the regulatory purpose is to facilitate self-sufficiency through
entrance into the work force. Indeed, the welfare drug testing case from
Michigan falls into this category because Michigan posits that facilitating
self-sufficiency is the central purpose of its welfare program. 3 9 It would be
unpopular, and probably difficult, to contend that there is little correlation
between substance abuse and difficulty finding or holding a job. As a
result, a strong correlation would be hard to deny, and a deferential
approach would be hard to avoid. The possibility of executive or
legislative manipulation of regulatory ends shows that a correlation test
greatly raises the potential for a Fourth Amendment that lacks an inviolable
sphere of protection. The possibility of manipulation is real, particularly
139.

See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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because public safety rationales can be invoked with respect to all
regulatory schemes.
The judiciary must avoid this outcome, and is well positioned to do so.
The judiciary has considerable power to resist a minimizing of its role in
deciding upon the constitutionality of suspicionless civil searches because
it will control the degree of deference that it extends. It is easy enough for
the judiciary to protect itself on this score by declaring that constitutional
limits exist to the degree of deference that it can extend in constitutional
matters. Such a declaration certainly is legitimate under our separation of
powers, and merely acknowledges that, unlike the separation of powers
concern behind Chevron, the separation of powers concern in constitutional
interpretation is profoundly anti-majoritarian. These separation of powers
concerns require that judicial deference on constitutional matters be limited
because legislative or executive efforts to mandate too much judicial
deference would fundamentally alter the judiciary's adjudicative role that
was integral to our constitutional design and the Framers' intent,1 40 by
emasculating the system of checks and balances that is integral to the
separation of powers.14 1 By drawing the line that prevents this result, the
judiciary can assert its power in a self-protective--but proper-manner,
and prevent the executive and legislative branches from excluding it from a
meaningful role in determining constitutionality.
CONCLUSION

A merger of Fourth Amendment civil search and administrative law may
be occurring in the Supreme Court. If so, then the Court's special needs
cases may be subject to greater predictability if one considers the degree of
correlation between the government's asserted special need and the
predefined regulatory objective at issue. Courts that perceive a strong
correlation may be disposed to extend deferential judicial review.
Conversely, a weak correlation may result in a more demanding judicial
inquiry into the validity of the government's justification for the search. If
140. See 1 CHARLES MONTEsQuIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 163 (T. Nugent
trans. 1878) ("There is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative
and executive."); see also James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, in THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS 347-49 (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 2d ed. 1961) (explaining that "the necessary partition
of power among the several departments" requires "contriving the interior structure of the
government, [such] that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the
means of keeping each other in their proper places" because "the great security against a
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to
those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others").
141. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 617 (1984) (stating that checks and
balances are "at the heart of the framers' formula"); see also James 0. Freedman, Crisis and
Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1041, 1047 (1975) (explaining
that checks and balances are the system "upon which the Constitution was made to rest").
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correct, this insight is valuable to litigants who challenge or defend
suspicionless civil search regimes. Challengers should emphasize the lack
of correlation between the search and the regulatory objective, while
defenders should stress how the search is consistent with and serves the
regulatory mission.
Though this new paradigm may be helpful in terms of divining the
outcomes of cases, its pervasiveness must be checked. The danger is that
regulatory objectives are manipulable through executive and legislative
action. Thus, allowing the correlation paradigm to run unchecked threatens
to fundamentally undermine Fourth Amendment protections against
overreaching governmental searches. As a result, though it may be helpful
to consider the correlation between the special need and the regulatory
objective, the correlation should be a limited factor, considered alongside
other Fourth Amendment factors that protect against governmental
overreaching, and should not be allowed to dominate the reasonableness
analysis.
The Supreme Court in Chandler may have signaled that it was well
aware of this. Chandler is not only consistent with the correlation
hypothesis; it also appears to constitute a stark rebuke to any argument that
the Court has fully embraced majoritarianism as its controlling legal
determinant in the special needs cases. It is true that the deference the
Supreme Court has shown in the suspicionless civil search cases appears to
represent its willingness to give majoritarianism a significant role in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. But Chandler strongly signals that the Court
properly intends to limit the role of majoritarianism, which is necessary to
preserving the separation of powers. Were the Supreme Court following a
fully majoritarian approach to the Fourth Amendment, Chandler would
have affirmed the suspicionless drug testing of electoral candidates. Other
than a referendum, there is no greater example of majoritarian will than
legislative action becoming law, and there is no constituency better able to
use the majoritarian process to protect itself than legislators. Though the
Chandler drug testing program applied to executive officers with little to
no role in the law-making process, such as the state school superintendent,
the commissioners of agriculture and labor, and judges, it also applied to
electoral candidates for governor as well as for legislative seats in the
General Assembly, which is comprised of both the state House and
Senate. 142 Chandler'srejection of the suspicionless drug testing regime that
legislators imposed on themselves strongly hints that the Court is
disinclined from adopting a completely majoritarian approach to the Fourth
Amendment.
142.

520 U.S. at 309-10.
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Thus, though the future direction of a deferential model in suspicionless
civil search cases is not yet clear, Chandler at least indicates that the
Supreme Court continues to recognize itself as the ultimate arbiter of
Fourth Amendment constitutionality. Whether it exercises that power to
heed the voices of the majority of commentators who are calling for reform
of the special needs principle and greater protections from suspicionless
civil searches remains to be seen. What should be clear, however, is that
those who desire these greater protections will best persuade the Court by
proposing new means of achieving those protections that do not
unacceptably conflict with the modem regulatory state's need to conduct
such searches.
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